integrity despite several servers and clients being corrupted by an intruder, in addition to others failing benignly. More precisely, a service is replicated by n servers in such a way that a correct client will accept a correct server's response if, for some prespecified parameter k, at least k servers are correct and fewer than k servers are corrupt. The issue of maintaining causality among client requests is also addressed. A security breach resulting from an intruder's ability to effect a violation of causality in the sequence of requests processed by the service is illustrated. An approach to counter this problem is proposed that requires that fewer than k servers are corrupt and, to ensure liveness, that k < n -2t, where t is the assumed maximum total number of both corruptions and benign failures suffered by servers in any system run. An important and novel feature of these schemes is that the client need not be able to identify or authenticate even a single 1 Introduction
Distributedsystems are often structuredin terms of clients and services. A serviceexports a set of commands, which clients invoke by issuingrequestato the service.After executing a command, the servicemay return an appropriate responseto the clientthat invoked the command. In the simplest case,the serviceisimplemented by only one server,ffthisserverisnot su_ciently immune to failure, however, then the servicemust be replicated.
In hostileenvironments, replication introduces other problems. For instance,it is often more difficult, or at leastrequiresmore resources, to protect many serversfrom corruptionby an intruder than it is to protect only a singleserver. A replicatedserviceshould thus be designed to remain availableand correctdespiteseveralserversbeing corrupted by an intruder (in addition to others fairing benignly). One way to do this employs the state machine approach [23] to replicating the service,so that each serverindividually computes the resultand sends it to the client. If the client authenticatesthe response from each server and accepts the response,if any, sent by a majority of servers,then it obtains the correctresponse ifa majority of serversare correct.Such schemes, however, require that the clientbe able to identifyand authenticatethe serversthat comprise the service.This may be difficult ifthe setof serverscan change over time or ifthere is no trustworthy source from which the clientcan obtain the identities and authenticationinformationof the servers.
In this paper we propose a combined solutionto these problems using the state machine approach. In our method, the serviceis implemented by n serversin such a way that for some prespecifiedparameter k, a correctclientaccepts a response from the serviceprovided that at leastk serversare correct.Moreover, iffewer than k serversare corrupt,any response accepted at a correct clientisguaranteed to have been computed by a correctserver.An important featureof thisscheme is that the clientpossessesexactly one publickey for the service(as opposed to,e.g., one for each server)and can treat the serviceas a singleobjectforthe purposes of authentication. This enhances applicationmodularity and significantly simplifies the serviceinterfacefor clients.We emphasize that the clientneed not know the identityof even a singleserverto authenticatethe responseof the service.
Even in a system with fewer than k corrupt servers,at leastk correctservers,and the above guarantees,correctclients may accept improper responsesfrom the serviceifan intruderhas caused the correctserversto process improper requestsor to process requestsin an incorrectorder. In this paper we also discuss thisissue.We focus on an attack in which an intrudereffects and exploitsa violation of causality in the sequence of requestsprocessedby the service.(While similarto an attack described in [20] ,thisattack is more severebecause it involvescorrupt servers.)We alsopropose a way to avoid thisattack that requiresthat the clientpossess at most one additionalpublickey for the service, that fewer than k serversare corrupt,and, to ensure liveness, that k < n -2t,where t is the assumed maximum totalnumber of both corruptionsand benign failures sufferedby servers in any system run.
The above discussionmay be evocativeof the large body of literature providing solutionsto various distributedcomputing problems in models where Byzantine failures can occur but authenticationis possible(see [17, 24] ). Nevertheless,our work has a somewhat differentemphasis: we employ specific cryptographictechniques to achieve the aforementioned results, and in facta significant contributionof our work is the demonstration of the practicalvalue of these techniques.Our approach thus stands in contrastto the body of literature just described,which typicailyassumes only a conventionaldigitalsignaturescheme.
The remainder of thispaper is structured as follows.In section2 we give a briefoverview of the state machine approach to replication; for more detail, the reader should see [23] .In section3
we enumerate our assumptions about the system. In section4 we present a method of implementing servicesthat provides the availability and integrityguarantees outlined above. In section 5, we discussthe importance of maintaining causalityamong clientrequestsand a method to counter an intruder'sattempts to exploitviolations of causality. In section 6 we outlinerelated work, and we conclude in section7. should be processed in the order they were issued,and ifone request could have caused another from a different client, then a statemachine receivingboth should process the former first. Execution of each request resultsin some response(i.e., output),which we assume is returned to the clientthat issuedthe request.Responses of a state machine are completely determined by itsinitial state and the sequence of requestsitprocesses.
State machine replication is a general method of implementing a fault-tolerant serviceby simultaneously employing many state machine serversand coordinatingclientinteractions with them.
If allserversaxe initialized to the same state,and ifaU correctserversprocess the same sequence of requests,then allcorrect servers willgive the same response to any given request. By properly combining the responses of the servers, where "properly" depends on the type of failures being considered,the response of the fault-tolerant serviceisobtained. at the end of a list of received messages that is available to be read by the coordination module.
Messages are received only from servers, according to an atomic broadcast protocol T_ that is tolerant of t < n server failures; henceforth we assume that a total of at most t servers fall in any system run.
The protocol _ satisfies the following specification.
Receipt

Atomicity:
A message is either received at all correct servers exactly once or is never received at any correct server. 
Delivery
Atomicity:
A request is either delivered at all correct servers exactly once or is never delivered at any correct server.
Delivery
Va_dity:
A correct server delivers a request from a correct client iff the latter previously issued that request.
That is,allcorrectserversdeliverthe same sequence of requests.
Delivery Consistency: The sequence of requestsdeliveredby an honest server is a prefixof the sequence of requestsdeliveredby a correctserver.
Assuming that each server is initialized to the same state, these properties imply that all correct and honest servers will produce the same response (or no response) to a given request. The communication module of a client accepts a response m for the application module by ca_Uing accept(m).
Preserving Integrity and Availability
RecaLl from section I that our first goal isa servicethat satisfies the followingproperties,forsome
Integrit_ ff corrupt < k, then the response accepted at a correct client, if any, is that computed by a correct server.
Availability:
If correct > k, then a correct client will accept a response from the service.
We satisfy these requirements by replacingthe respond(c,m) and accept(m) routinesof servers and clients, respectively, with two new routines,respond'(c, m) and acceptS(m),that willensure these properties.Therefore,the new structuresof principals willbe as picturedin figure2. Although we have replaced the respond routinewith respond' at the interface provided to the applicationmodule of each server,we assume that respond is still availableforexecution by the coordinationmodule.
Similarly, we assume that accept isstill available to the communication module of each client. 
I Network
The respond_ routinesat the different serverswillemploy a (k,n)-thresholdsignaturescheme.
A (k,r_)-threshold signaturescheme is,informally, a method of generating a publickey and r_shares of the corresponding privatekey in such a way that for any message m, each share can be used to produce a partialresult from m, where any k.of these partiM results can be combined into a signature form that can be verified with the publickey. Moreover, knowledge of k shares is necessary to sign m, in the sense that without the privatekey itiscomputationaUy infeasible to (i)createa signature form without k.partialresultsform, (ii) compute a partialresultform without the corresponding share,or (iii) compute a share or the privatekey without k.other shares.
Cryptanalytic attacks against threshold signatureschemes differfrom those against their conventionalcounterpartsin that the cryptanalystmay possess some number of shares and be able to acquire partialresults, in additionto message/signature pairs.For our purposes, we willsay that a (k., n)-thresholdsignaturescheme is secure if,informally,there is no feasible algorithm that, given some numbers of these items of information,can perform any of tasks (i)-(ili) above for some new message m. Note that to be secure,a signaturescheme need not be able to tolerateattacksin which a cryptcualystcan see the partialresults or the signaturefor any message of itschoice,as would be possiblein a chosen message attack.. Such attacks can easilybe prevented [5].
Our respondt routineisnot dependent upon any particularimplementation of a (k,r_)-threshold signaturescheme, although for concretenesswe outlinethe necessary detailsof an implementation proposed in [7] ;a detailedunderstanding of thisscheme is not essential. 
Execute respond(c,(rn,Am,T)).
Routine acceptS(rn) at clientc:
i. If rn isnot of the form (rn_, 5,),then return to the calling routine.
If 5"isa validsignatureform _,then execute accept(rn_). 4
Claim i If the threshold signature scheme is secure, then thi_ protocol satisfies Integrit_t.
Proof. If the signaturescheme issecure and corrupt < k, then the corrupt serverscannot generate k partialresultsfrom which to sign a message. Thus, the only message that could be properly signed is that computed by a correctserver.O Potentiallythe most computationally expensive part of the algorithm is step 2 of the respond_ routine,in which the serversorts through the partialresults it receivesuntilit findsa T of sizek such that A,_,T isa validsignature.The servermust examine at most only the first I = rain(n,k % t) partialresults received(from I unique servers), and at most (_)subsetsof partialresults, because in
Ipartialresultsare at leastk correctpartialresults (ifcorrect:>k). While thiscould be expensive if
Iislarge and k _ I/2,the expected search time fora validsignatureshould be small in the common case in most systems,i.e., when n and corrupt aresmall. One optimizationisto have a serveralways include itsown index in T (i.e., always include itsown partialresultin the signaturecomputation).
Also, certainheuristics, such as using partialresultsfrom a combination of serversthat previously worked, can be used to furtherreduce the expected searchtime. Additional optimizationsare a topic of ongoing research.
Preserving Input Causality
One guarantee provided in the previous section is that if corrupt < k, then the response accepted at a correct client will be the response computed by a correct server. Even the output of a correct server, we concern ourselves only with the requirement that correct servers deliver requests in an order consistent with causality (see section 2). A common method of preserving causality among client requests is for each client to refrain from sending any messages between the time it issues a request to the service and the time at which the request is delivered at some honest or correct server [23] .
Consider the case,however, in which a correctclient issuesa request to the service, and afterreceiving the request,a corrupt serversends a message to a corrupt client. Ifthe corrupt client subsequently issuesa request,then there isa causalrelationship between the two requests.However, itisnot clear how thisrelationship can be detected by correctservers.
To see why thismay be important, suppose that the serviceof interest isa trading servicethat tradesstocks and that a clientissuesa request to purchase sharesof stock through thisservice.After discoveringthe intended purchase, a corrupt servercould colludewith a corrupt clientas described above to issue a request forthe same stock to the service.Ifthe correctserversdeliverthisrequest before that of the correctclient, thisrequest may adjust the apparent demand for the stock and raise the price offeredto the correct client.Thus, by allowingthe causallysubsequent request of the corrupt clientto be deliveredbefore the request of the correctclient, a type of "insidertrading" may occur. It is worth noting that accesscontrolsalone cannot naturallyavoid thisproblem, as the intentis that any clientcan request to purchase stock at any time.
In the reminder of this section,we present new request and deliveryroutines,respectively denoted request'(m) and deh'ver'((c, m)), that replace request(m) and de/]ver((c, m)). Therefore,if
used with the respond' and accept'routinesof section4, principals would be structured as in figure   3 . These new routinesprotect correctclients from the type of attack described above, in the sense that any request based on informationobtained from a correctclient's request(c,m) can be delivered at correctserversonly after(c,m). As before,we willuse deS"verin our implementation of de_ver', and similarlyfor request and request'. In additionto satisfying CausaLity,request _ and deliver' must alsoensure that clientrequestsare deliveredaccording to the specificatibn of atomic broaxlcast--i.e., that DeliveryAtomicity, Delivery
Validity, Delivery Order, and Delivery Consistency still hold. 
Communication Module
Network deriver' that we propose satisfyallbut the "if" directionof Delivery Validitywith no further assumptions; to ensure that a correctclient's request willeventuallybe deliveredat allcorrectservers, we requirek < n -2t,and thus n > 2t.
Our deh'ver I routine employs a (k,n)-thresholdcwptosystern. A (k,n)-thresholdcryptosystem is,informally, a method of generating a publickey and n sharesof the corresponding privatekey in such a way that forany message rn encrypted under the publickey,each share can be used to produce a partialresultfrom the ciphertextof m, where any/¢ of these partialresultscan be combined to decrypt m. Moreover, knowledge of k shares is necessary to decrypt m, in the sense that without the private key it is computationaJJy infeasible to (i)decrypt m without k partialresultsfor rn,
(ii)compute a partialresultfor rn without the corresponding share,or (ill) compute a share or the privatekey without k other shares.
As with thresholdsignatureschemes, cryptanalytic attacksagainstthresholdcryptosystems may involvethe use of partialresults and some number of shares,in additionto plalntext/ciphertext pairs.
For our purposes, we willsay that a (k,n)-thresholdcryptosystem is secure if,informally,there is no feasiblealgorithm that, given some numbers of these items of information, can perform any of tasks (i)-(lli) above for some new ciphertextm. Again we point out that to be secure,a threshold cryptosystem need not be able to tolerateattacksin which a cryptanalystcan see the partialresults or the plalntextfor any ciphertextof itschoice,as would be possiblein a chosen cipherteztattack.
This is in accordance with the securityof allimplementations of threshold cryptosystems thus far proposed: allproposed implementations axe known to be vulnerable to chosen ciphertextattacks, because the conventionalcryptosystems on which they are builtare vulnerable to such attacks. Suppose that we are using the RSA threshold cryptosystem described above and that we have the initial conditions assumed in the previous section; i.e., server s; is secretly given sole possession of K_, any principal can reliably obtain the public key (e, N) of the service, and all servers know (a priori) Pi,T for all i and T. The basic idea of our algorithm is that each client c encrypts the contents m of its request with the public key of the service, in an attempt to force k servers to cooperate to decrypt it. Then, each correct or honest server refrains from broadcasting its partial result for 1. The corrupt server chooses an arbitrary x and computes y -z e rood N; i.e., z =-y_ rood N. s 2. Via a. corrupt cl/ent, the corrupt server issues a request with contents ym rood N to the service.
6The obvious simplified form of this attack, in which z and y are chosen so that z =-y --1 rood N, could easily be made unproductive for the corrupt server: if each correct client signs the contents of its request before encrypt/ng it and each correct server derivers a request on behalf of the client whose signature _ppeaxs on the decrypted contents (and not necessarily the client that issued the request), then by i_uing a request contain/n_ rn, the corrupt server would only expedite the delivery of the correct client's request.
3. The corrupt server collects k partial results for ym rood iV and forms (yra) _ mod N.
4.
The corrupt server computes a:-1 --y-a mod N, and then
(NB: If z does not have an inverse rood N, then the corrupt server can factor N because gcd(x, N) is a prime factor of N.) Then, the request I and de//ver r routines execute as follows.
tOne such implementation employs a determia_tic public key cryptosystem: the diges_ for a message is computed by encrypting the message under an a p_ori, commonly known public key, for which the corresponding private key h_-_ been destroyed and is not known. We now prove that the above protocolsatisfies Causality. In a failure-free run, the replacement of deliver with deliver' results in an additional n executions of 7_, which can be executed concurrently.Thus, when this protocolis used to disseminate client requestsand the protocolof section4 isused to sign responses,the totalmessage comp|exity is2n+ I broadcasts (n of which can be reliable only; see section4) and t + i responses,structured in four communication phases. And, a clientmay need two public keys for the service, depending on the particularcryptosystem and signaturescheme used.
As in the protocolof section4, step 4 of deh'ver' is potentially expensive,because itmay require k+t a serverto sort through ( _ ) subsets of partialresultsto be able to decrypt a request. In fact,a corrupt clientcan forceeach serverto sortthrough (k_t)subsets by sending a ciphertextand digest that do not "match." As before,we rely on heuristics, a small (_-t),and a small corrupt in the 
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Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a method for securelyreplicating servicesusing the state machine approach.
Using our protocols, a servicecan be replicated as n serversin such a way that forsome prespecified parameter /c,a clientwillaccept a response computed by a correct serverprovided that at least /¢servers axe correct and fewer than /cserversare corrupt. We have also addressed the issue of ensuring causalityamong clientrequests.A securitybreach resultingfrom an intruder'sabilityto violatecausalitywas illustrated, and a safeand liveapproach was presented to counter thisproblem, provided that corrupt < k _< n -2t. An important and novel feature of our methods is that they free the client of the responsibility of learning the identity and public key of each server. This is achieved by employing two recent advances in cryptography, namely threshold cryptosystems and threshold signature schemes.
In addition to those topics of ongoing research mentioned in the previous sections, another direction of research is ways to employ the techniques described here in a hierarchical fashion to enhance the security of applications.
As a simple example of this, one could conceivably employ a different replicated service to produce each partial result for a message, and then these partixl results could be combined to either sign or decrypt this message appropriately. However, the consequences and benefits of such designs have not yet been fully investigated and will be discussed further elsewhere.
Another topic that has not been sufficiently studied is how the detect/on of corrupt clients and servers can be achieved and exploited to optimize our protocols. 
